報告題目🙎:A Dynamic Matching Mechanism for College Admissions:
Theory and Experiment(大學入學的一個動態匹配機製:理論與實驗)
報告人:龔冰琳(華東師範大學)
報告時間:2021年6月18日(星期五)上午10:00-11:30
報告地點:商學院大樓318會議室
邀請部門:經濟學系
報告人簡介❤️🔥:
龔冰琳於2006年獲得美國馬裏蘭大學經濟學博士學位,現任華東師範大學經濟管理學部研究員、博士生導師、菁英班學術總監‼️。曾在復旦大學和上海交通大學任教,並擔任美國加州大學歐文分校梁仕源📷、梁秀蓮中美商業和法律研究院兼職研究員、世界銀行、亞洲發展銀行顧問等職。她通過理論建模🫠、實驗和實證方法研究行為決策、機製設計、性別差異🃏、信息經濟學、行為金融等問題,論文發表在管理類國際頂級期刊Management Science和經濟學國際著名期刊Games and Economic Behavior🪡、Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Economic Psychology等上。2020年獲高等學校科學研究優秀成果獎(人文社會科學)論文二等獎,2018年獲得上海市哲學社會科學優秀成果獎學科學術獎論文一等獎。主持多項國家級、省部級和國際合作科研項目🪸。榮獲上海市領軍人才、浦江人才計劃、晨光計劃🐬、華東師範大學紫江青年學者💁♀️、復旦大學卓學計劃等人才計劃支持。
報告摘要:
Market design has provided many managerial insights into why certain market institutions fail while others succeed in allocating scarce resources in both the for and non-profit sectors. In this paper, we analyze a new form of dynamic matching mechanism enabled by innovations in information technology. We provide a theoretical and experimental examination of this mechanism in the context of college admissions in Inner Mongolia, China, where students are given real-time allocation feedback and are allowed to revise their choices. Theoretically, we show that efficient and stable outcomes arise in every rationalizable strategy profile if there is a sufficient number of revision opportunities. Experimentally, we find that in an environment with high strategic complexity, the Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism performs better than theoretical predictions: It is as stable as the Deferred Acceptance mechanism and as efficient as the Boston mechanism, with higher truth-telling rate than both of them. These results suggest that the Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism can be a good substitute for static mechanisms in complex environments. The Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism may also be useful in matching potential employers and employees in the labor market.